1 Security Considerations
2 =======================
4 This document discusses the various security issues that might affect
5 OpenDaylight. The document also lists specific recommendations to
6 mitigate security risks.
8 This document also contains information about the corrective steps
9 you can take if you discover a security issue with
10 OpenDaylight, and if necessary, contact the Security Response Team,
11 which is tasked with identifying and resolving security threats.
13 Overview of OpenDaylight Security
14 ---------------------------------
16 There are many different kinds of security vulnerabilities that could affect
17 an OpenDaylight deployment, but this guide focuses on those where (a) the
18 servers, virtual machines or other devices running OpenDaylight have been
19 properly physically (or virtually in the case of VMs) secured against untrusted
20 individuals and (b) individuals who have access, either via remote logins or
21 physically, will not attempt to attack or subvert the deployment intentionally
24 While those attack vectors are real, they are out of the scope of this
27 What remains in scope is attacks launched from a server, virtual machine, or
28 device other than the one running OpenDaylight where the attack does not have
29 valid credentials to access the OpenDaylight deployment.
31 The rest of this document gives specific recommendations for deploying
32 OpenDaylight in a secure manner, but first we highlight some high-level
33 security advantages of OpenDaylight.
35 * Separating the control and management planes from the data plane (both
36 logically and, in many cases, physically) allows possible security threats to
37 be forced into a smaller attack surface.
39 * Having centralized information and network control gives network
40 administrators more visibility and control over the entire network, enabling
41 them to make better decisions faster. At the same time,
42 centralization of network control can be an advantage only if access to that
45 .. note:: While both previous advantages improve security, they also make
46 an OpenDaylight deployment an attractive target for attack making
47 understanding these security considerations even more important.
49 * The ability to more rapidly evolve southbound protocols and how they are used
50 provides more and faster mechanisms to enact appropriate security mitigations
53 * OpenDaylight is built from OSGi bundles and the Karaf Java container. Both
54 Karaf and OSGi provide some level of isolation with explicit code boundaries,
55 package imports, package exports, and other security-related features.
57 * OpenDaylight has a history of rapidly addressing known vulnerabilities and
58 a well-defined process for reporting and dealing with them.
60 OpenDaylight Security Resources
61 -------------------------------
63 * If you have any security issues, you can send a mail to
64 *security@lists.opendaylight.org*.
66 * For the list of current OpenDaylight security issues that are either being
67 fixed or resolved, refer to
68 https://wiki.opendaylight.org/view/Security_Advisories.
70 * To learn more about the OpenDaylight security issues policies and procedure,
71 refer to https://wiki.opendaylight.org/view/Security:Main
73 Deployment Recommendations
74 --------------------------
76 We recommend that you follow the deployment guidelines in setting up
77 OpenDaylight to minimize security threats.
79 * The default credentials should be changed before deploying OpenDaylight.
81 * OpenDaylight should be deployed in a private network that cannot be accessed
84 * Separate the data network (that connects devices using the network) from the
85 management network (that connects the network devices to OpenDaylight).
87 .. note:: Deploying OpenDaylight on a separate, private management network does not
88 eliminate threats, but only mitigates them. By construction, some
89 messages must flow from the data network to the management network, e.g.,
90 OpenFlow *packet_in* messages, and these create an attack surface even if
93 * Implement an authentication policy for devices that connect to both the data
94 and management network. These are the devices which bridge, likely untrusted,
95 traffic from the data network to the management network.
100 OSGi is a Java-specific framework that improves the way that Java classes
101 interact within a single JVM. It provides an enhanced version of the
102 *java.lang.SecurityManager* (ConditionalPermissionAdmin) in terms of security.
104 Java provides a security framework that allows a security policy to grant
105 permissions, such as reading a file or opening a network connection, to
106 specific code. The code maybe classes from the jarfile loaded from a specific
107 URL, or a class signed by a specific key. OSGi builds on the standard Java
108 security model to add the following features:
110 * A set of OSGi-specific permission types, such as one that grants the right
111 to register an OSGi service or get an OSGi service from the service registry.
113 * The ability to dynamically modify permissions at runtime. This includes the
114 ability to specify permissions by using code rather than a text configuration
117 * A flexible predicate-based approach to determining which rules are
118 applicable to which *ProtectionDomain*. This approach is much more powerful
119 than the standard Java security policy which can only grant rights based on a
120 jarfile URL or class signature. A few standard predicates are provided,
121 including selecting rules based upon bundle symbolic-name.
123 * Support for bundle *local permissions* policies with optional further
124 constraints such as *DENY* operations. Most of this functionality is accessed
125 by using the *OSGi ConditionalPermissionAdmin* service which is part of the
126 OSGi core and can be obtained from the OSGi service registry. The
127 *ConditionalPermissionAdmin* API replaces the earlier *PermissionAdmin* API.
129 For more information, refer to http://www.osgi.org/Main/HomePage.
131 Securing the Karaf container
132 ----------------------------
134 Apache Karaf is a OSGi-based runtime platform which provides a lightweight
135 container for OpenDaylight and applications. Apache Karaf uses
136 either Apache Felix Framework or Eclipse Equinox OSGi frameworks, and provide
137 additional features on top of the framework.
139 Apache Karaf provides a security framework based on Java Authentication and
140 Authorization Service (JAAS) in compliance with OSGi recommendations,
141 while providing RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) mechanism for the console and
142 Java Management Extensions (JMX).
144 The Apache Karaf security framework is used internally to control the access
145 to the following components:
155 The remote management capabilities are present in Apache Karaf by default,
156 however they can be disabled by using various configuration alterations. These
157 configuration options may be applied to the OpenDaylight Karaf distribution.
159 .. note:: Refer to the following list of publications for more information on
160 implementing security for the Karaf container.
162 * For role-based JMX administration, refer to
163 http://karaf.apache.org/manual/latest/users-guide/monitoring.html.
165 * For remote SSH access configuration, refer to
166 http://karaf.apache.org/manual/latest/users-guide/remote.html.
168 * For WebConsole access, refer to
169 http://karaf.apache.org/manual/latest/users-guide/webconsole.html.
171 * For Karaf security features, refer to
172 http://karaf.apache.org/manual/latest/developers-guide/security-framework.html.
174 Disabling the remote shutdown port
175 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
177 You can lock down your deployment post installation. Set
178 ``karaf.shutdown.port=-1`` in ``etc/custom.properties`` or ``etc/config.properties`` to
179 disable the remote shutdown port.
181 Securing Southbound Plugins
182 ---------------------------
184 Many individual southbound plugins provide mechanisms to secure their
185 communication with network devices. For example, the OpenFlow plugin supports
186 TLS connections with bi-directional authentication and the NETCONF plugin
187 supports connecting over SSH. Meanwhile, the Unified Secure Channel plugin
188 provides a way to form secure, remote connections for supported devices.
190 When deploying OpenDaylight, you should carefully investigate the secure
191 mechanisms to connect to devices using the relevant plugins.
193 Securing OpenDaylight using AAA
194 -------------------------------
196 AAA stands for Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting. All three of
197 can help improve the security posture of and OpenDaylight deployment. In this
198 release, only authentication is fully supported, while authorization is an
199 experimental feature and accounting remains a work in progress.
201 The vast majority of OpenDaylight's northbound APIs (and all RESTCONF APIs) are
202 protected by AAA by default when installing the +odl-restconf+ feature. In the
203 cases that APIs are *not* protected by AAA, this will be noted in the
204 per-project release notes.
206 By default, OpenDaylight has only one user account with the username and
207 password *admin*. This should be changed before deploying OpenDaylight.
209 Security Considerations for Clustering
210 --------------------------------------
212 While OpenDaylight clustering provides many benefits including high
213 availability, scale-out performance, and data durability, it also opens a new
214 attack surface in the form of the messages exchanged between the various
215 instances of OpenDaylight in the cluster. In the current OpenDaylight release,
216 these messages are neither encrypted nor authenticated meaning that anyone with
217 access to the management network where OpenDaylight exchanges these clustering
218 messages can forge and/or read the messages. This means that if clustering is
219 enabled, it is even more important that the management network be kept secure
220 from any untrusted entities.